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Ontario’s Ministry of Training, Colleges and Universities is currently at-
tempting to increase institutional differentiation within that province’s post-
secondary education system. We contend that such policies aimed to trigger 
organizational change are likely to generate unanticipated responses. Using 
insights from the field of organizational studies, we anticipate four plausible 
responses from universities to the ministry’s directives: remaining sensitive 
to their market demand, ceremonial compliance, continued status seeking, 
and isomorphism. We provide several policy recommendations that might 
help the ministry overcome these possible barriers to further differentiation.  
Résumé
Le ministère de la Formation et des Collèges et Universités de l’Ontario 
cherche à accroître la différentiation institutionnelle du système d’éducation 
postsecondaire ontarien. Nous soutenons que les politiques publiques visant à 
déclencher ce changement organisationnel vont vraisemblablement engendrer 
des réactions imprévues. Tirant nos connaissances des champs d’études 
organisationnelles, nous anticipons quatre réactions potentielles aux directives 
du ministère par les universités. Ainsi, les universités peuvent : demeurer 
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réceptives aux demandes de leur clientèle, entreprendre une conformité 
superficielle, s’engager dans une recherche perpétuelle d’un statut supérieur 
ou favoriser l’isomorphisme. Nous suggérons plusieurs recommandations 
de politiques publiques qui peuvent aider le ministère à faire progresser la 
différentiation en surmontant ces éventuels obstacles.
Introduction
In light of financial challenges caused by the economic downturn of 2008, and due to 
anticipated waning enrolment growth, Ontario’s Ministry of Training, Colleges and Uni-
versities (MTCU) has identified “differentiation” as a key priority for its higher education 
system (MTCU, 2013, pp. 4–6). In a highly differentiated system, each college and univer-
sity would have sufficiently distinct strategic mandates, research profiles, and academic 
programs. The common rationale for differentiation is to reduce unnecessary duplication, 
promote efficiency, and encourage effectiveness by incentivizing each institution to build 
on its particular, well-established strengths (Weingarten & Deller, 2010). Through such 
a strategy, the ministry seeks to trigger more differentiation by having each institution 
craft its own unique strategic plan and subsequently ensuring that each adheres to that 
plan. Through this process, it hopes to reshape the structure of Ontario post-secondary 
education (PSE).
But how might Ontario colleges and universities respond to this initiative? Our paper 
ponders some possible consequences of this centralized attempt to promote more differ-
entiation. We use insights from the field of organization studies—an interdisciplinary field 
of research composed of organizationally inclined sociologists, economists, political sci-
entists, and business management scholars—to examine how change often occurs among 
organizations such as universities and colleges. Based on our reading of this literature, 
we identify four forces that are likely to mediate the MTCU’s efforts to boost institutional 
differentiation: (1) local market demand, (2) the tendency of colleges and universities to 
emulate high-status universities, a process known as isomorphism, (3) the capacity of in-
stitutions to engage in ceremonial compliance rather than substantive change, and (4) the 
tendency of higher education organizations to engage in status seeking. Before discuss-
ing the implications of these social forces, we begin by providing a basic overview of the 
landscape of the Ontario PSE system, then review the current public policy discourse on 
differentiation in the province.
The Landscape of Ontario PSE
The Ontario PSE system is composed of four main sectors: public universities, public 
colleges, private religious universities, and private career colleges. Public institutions are 
currently the only ones that receive stable and direct financial support from the provincial 
government via annual operating grants. Such grants are intended to support “general 
educational operations,” such as staff salaries and the costs of maintaining physical facili-
ties (Snowdown and Associates, 2009, p. 19).1 Data from the 2008–2013 academic years 
indicate that government operating grants constitute the main source of funding for pub-
lic universities, representing 48% of their overall budget. The other prime source of funds 
is tuition (33%) (COU, 2014, p. 2). Ontario’s 20 public universities and 24 public com-
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munity colleges educate the lion’s share of the province’s post-secondary students, with 
combined full-time enrolments of approximately 650,000, 70% of which are in the uni-
versity sector (Pizarro Milian & Hicks, 2014). Public universities focus on undergraduate 
and graduate education and are also the main producers of scientific research within the 
provincial PSE system (Weingarten, Hicks, Jonker & Smith, 2013). Community colleges 
focus predominantly on providing vocationally oriented certificates and diplomas (Hicks, 
Weingarten, Jonker & Liu, 2013). However, several colleges, such as Humber, Sheridan, 
and Seneca, have recently become more like universities, granting applied degrees and 
conducting applied research, although their penetration into the university sector re-
mains limited (Hicks et al, 2013; Pringle & Huisman, 2011; Shanahan & Jones, 2007). 
There are also two private sectors in Ontario PSE that do not directly receive funds 
from the province, although they indirectly receive funds when their students get provin-
cial tuition loans and grants. About 400 private career colleges share an estimated full-
time enrolment of approximately 50,000 (Pizarro Milian & Hicks, 2014). These figures, 
though, do not include enrollees at a large but unknown number of unregistered institu-
tions that are not overseen by the provincial ministry (Davies & Taylor, 2007). Private ca-
reer colleges occupy a market niche that overlaps with that of the public colleges, provid-
ing certificates and diplomas in many of the same vocational program areas. They claim 
to differentiate themselves from their public counterparts by offering more flexible and 
expedient program delivery that reduces students’ time to completion. The Ontario PSE 
system is rounded out by 17 small, private universities that mostly specialize in theologi-
cal training, although some, such as Redeemer and Tyndale, also offer degrees in other 
fields. Recent policy document estimate the enrolment in this last sector to be minimal 
(Pizarro Milian & Hicks, 2014), perhaps only one percent of the provincial total. 
Differentiation in Ontario Policy Discourse
While discussions of differentiation can be traced back to the 1970s, they re-emerged 
in Ontario policy discourse in 2005 (Skolnik, 2013). The MTCU document Ontario: A 
Leader in Learning urged the province to actively “encourage the distinct evolution of 
each institution” within the system “through the tuition framework, accountability ar-
rangements and the design of the province’s funding formula” (MTCU, 2005, p. 29). It 
called for the development of distinct missions and specialized programs while eliminat-
ing unwarranted duplication (MTCU, 2005, p. 42).
Since 2005, four more major documents have called for more differentiation in Ontar-
io PSE. First, in Academic Transformation, Clark and his colleagues (2009) delineated a 
series of inefficiencies in Ontario’s PSE system, describing it as “unsustainable” without 
further differentiation by geographic location, program, credential level, and targeted cli-
entele (p. 138). They recommended establishing an open university, creating more online 
courses, founding a series of teaching-focused universities, and allowing more colleges 
to grant degrees. Second, The Benefits of Greater Differentiation of Ontario’s University 
Sector (Weingarten & Deller, 2010) described differentiation along several axes, includ-
ing enrolment size, funding, programs offered, online versus traditional delivery, prestige, 
and student demographics. Third, Clark and colleagues’ (2011) sequel publication, Aca-
demic Reform, echoed earlier calls for substantial reform to Ontario PSE. The most note-
worthy element of their roadmap for change was a call for a new set of all-undergraduate, 
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teaching-oriented universities. This call reflected ongoing concerns over the per-student 
costs of education at research-intensive universities and the tendency of these institutions 
to deprioritize undergraduate education in comparison to graduate training and research. 
Further, the authors noted the tendency of new and/or satellite universities to gradually 
shift their focus over time from undergraduate teaching towards research, a process that 
produces increased homogeneity rather than differentiation. To curb this tendency, they 
called for many changes, including greater numbers of teaching-stream faculty mandated 
to spend most of their time (80%) on undergraduate teaching. Fourth, the MTCU’s 2013 
document, Ontario’s Differentiation Policy Framework for Postsecondary Education, 
discussed how increased differentiation could help the province provide students with 
affordable access to a greater continuum of vocational and academic experiences despite 
increasingly constrained provincial budgets. This document touted differentiation as a 
mechanism for nurturing each institution’s established strengths while guiding each to 
operate as a complementary part of a larger whole. It also identified several dimensions 
of differentiation, including meeting the needs of each local community, specializing in 
teaching or research/graduate education, and creating unique programs.
These four documents have been complemented by two others produced by the High-
er Education Quality Council of Ontario (HEQCO) (Hicks et al., 2013; Weingarten et al., 
2013) that aimed to clarify the meaning of differentiation. One framed differentiation 
among public universities in terms of research intensiveness and comprehensiveness. It 
described the University of Toronto as being in its own league, competing with other top 
universities across the world, followed by a cluster of research-intensive universities con-
sisting of McMaster, Western, Waterloo, Ottawa, Queen’s, and Guelph. It then described a 
group of primarily undergraduate universities: Algoma, Nipissing, UOIT, Laurier, Trent, 
Brock, Lakehead, and Laurentian. Sandwiched between these two groups were univer-
sities that did not fit neatly into either research or undergraduate clusters: York, Car-
leton, Windsor, and Ryerson. The other document framed differentiation among public 
community colleges in terms of program diversity and participation in degree granting. 
It grouped colleges that are very engaged in degree granting—Seneca, Sheridan, George 
Brown, and Humber—versus others that are far less involved.
Analytical Methods
In the next section we draw on recent theoretical and empirical work within the inter-
disciplinary field of organizational studies to anticipate some social processes that could 
be triggered by government attempts to boost institutional differentiation among its pub-
lic universities. Since this is an analytical essay, we do not utilize any unique data sources 
but instead draw on key theories from a large literature, particularly foundational and 
recent texts in the new institutional (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Meyer & Rowan, 1977; 
Scott, 2008) and resource dependency (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978) traditions. Both of these 
theoretical perspectives adopt what have been termed open systems approaches to un-
derstanding organizational behaviour (Scott, 2008). Like Canadian work on PSE (e.g., 
Fisher et al., 2006; Jones, 2004; Pringle & Huisman, 2011; Shanahan & Jones, 2007), 
they acknowledge the influence of regulatory bodies on organizational behaviour but also 
emphasize other factors that are sometimes ignored by policy makers, such as organiza-
tional prestige, professional and cultural norms (Quirke, 2013), and various strategies by 
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which organizations might evade full compliance with externally imposed policies (Oliver, 
1991; 1992). We complement these theoretical discussions with illustrative studies from 
contemporary education research in order to provide prominent examples from Canada 
and other jurisdictions, mostly the United States and Britain. We attempt to synthesize 
insights from organizational theory with key empirical studies to provide a prognosis of 
likely events if the province proceeds with its differentiation policy. 
Policy discourse on differentiation has highlighted many of its potential benefits yet 
has focused far less on unanticipated but plausible reactions by Ontario colleges and uni-
versities to such initiatives. Below we identify some possible dynamics that could be set in 
motion by such central directives and conclude with several recommendations for central 
authorities to reduce these potential barriers to differentiation.
The Nature of Student Demand: Market Forces in Higher Education
Attempts to change organizations against the flow of market demand, no matter how 
rational or justified they may appear to policy makers, can produce undesired results. 
Educational historians and sociologists have long catalogued various kinds of failures in 
centrally planned educational expansion, whether in Canada (Fleming, 1971), the United 
States (Brint, Proctor, Murphy, & Hanneman, 2012; Kraatz & Zajac, 1996; Labaree, 1997, 
2012), or Britain (Wolf, 2003, 2011). Despite looking at a diverse array of historical peri-
ods and regulatory environments, each of these analyses suggests that central planning 
by government and/or institutional leaders can be stymied if it is not sufficiently aligned 
with the wants of educational consumers.
In Canada, the rise and fall of Ontario technical institutes in the 1940s, 1950s, and 
1960s is a prime example. During this period, the province established these institutes to 
provide training that was more specialized and applied than that offered by universities. 
But due to minimal popular demand, these institutes never captured a considerable share 
of the PSE student market. By 1963, they had enrolled only 4,000 students (Skolnik, 2010, 
p. 4), and by 1965, this figure had shrunk to approximately 2,500 (Fleming, 1971, p. 452). 
This lack of demand severely limited their lifespan. Their failure was eventually corrected 
by policies that reshaped technical institutes into entities that more closely resembled to-
day’s community colleges and universities. For example, the Provincial Institute of Min-
ing and the Northern Ontario Institute of Technology were absorbed during the creation 
of St. Clair College (Fleming, 1971, p. 522). Similarly, the Provincial Institute of Trades 
and the Provincial Institute of Trades and Occupations were brought together to found 
George Brown College (Fleming, 1971, p. 522). Meanwhile, others such as Lakehead Tech-
nical Institute and the Ryerson Institute of Technology were eventually revamped into 
universities. These transformations were necessitated by public demand for “broader” in-
stitutions rather than narrower technical alternatives to universities (Skolnik, 2010, p. 4).
In the United Kingdom, Wolf (2003, 2011) has similarly documented how policy mak-
ers’ attempts to increase participation in vocational training failed due to misalignment 
with student and parent preferences. Despite the introduction of new National Vocational 
Qualifications (NVQs) during the 1990s, students continued to opt for more traditional 
academic credentials. A decade later, half of all NVQs had effectively gone unused: 364 
had never been awarded to a single candidate, while another 43 had each been awarded 
to only a single individual. Many others fell short of double figures. In response to such 
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dismal failure, policy makers crafted a more general NVQ that more closely resembled 
academic A-levels, desired by most UK students (Wolf, 2003, pp. 75–76). This more aca-
demic credential generated a much more favourable response from students. More re-
cently, Wolf (2011, p. 9) has continued to characterize British attempts to centrally plan 
vocational education as “inherently ineffective” and “expensive and counterproductive” 
(p. 21). She faulted the central government’s constant redesign, re-regulation and reor-
ganization of vocational education for being disconnected from both labour-market and 
PSE demand. Wolf found that innovative and successful vocational credentials were cre-
ated when planning and design of those credentials was delegated to local levels. This 
decentralized decision making, she suggested, allowed institutions to more effectively re-
spond to changing labour markets and to local employers2 who had a stake in vocational 
education. Their direct input ensured that courses and qualifications had genuine labour-
market value and credibility.
The American experience also offers plenty of examples of centrally planned change 
being thwarted by market forces. Looking far back in history, Labaree (1997) noted how 
the imported German research university model lessened the popularity of the pre-exist-
ing American land-grant college, which had focused almost exclusively on teaching and 
vocational skills training. The new research university was soon seen to offer an “up-
per track” that provided access to attractive social positions and was thereby compatible 
with (North) American values of opportunity and upward mobility. As many students 
and educators were reluctant to settle for “lower-track” college programs, their demand 
for vocational-oriented training waned, driving land-grant universities and colleges to 
become isomorphic with their new counterparts by offering more academic and profes-
sional credentials and by conducting research.
Looking at more recent American history, Labaree (2012) has seen much evidence 
that consumers, much more than central decision makers, eventually dictate the shape of 
higher education. For instance, many private liberal arts colleges and other institutions 
have gradually shifted their programs in more vocational and professional directions, away 
from their traditional missions, in response to consumer preferences (see Brint, Riddle, & 
Hanneman, 2006; Brint, Proctor, Murphy, Turk-Bicakci, & Hanneman, 2009; Kraatz & 
Zajac, 1996). The internal structures of higher status universities are also strongly shaped 
by students’ non-academic preferences. In a recent case study of a relatively high-status 
Midwest university, Armstrong and Hamilton (2013) showed how the institution catered 
to students with the strongest family connections and financial resources by supporting 
a variety of non-academic organizations such as fraternities, sororities, and other clubs, 
and by attempting to maintain a vibrant social atmosphere on campus. By contrast, lower 
status universities cater mostly to students of lower socioeconomic status by focusing less 
on social organizations and more on applied and vocational programs (for other examples 
of such contrasts in US higher education, see also Mullen [2010] and Stuber [2011]).
Beyond consumer preferences, PSE organizations are also sensitive to any shifts in 
other revenue streams, and such shifts can undermine centrally planned change. Steven 
Brint and his colleagues found that selective institutions with large endowments can insu-
late themselves from changing consumer preferences and respond instead to the demands 
of wealthy private donors (see Brint, 2013; Brint et al., 2011). This finding is important 
because Ontario post-secondary institutions have multiple revenue sources beyond the 
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MTCU. While the ministry is the largest direct funder of Ontario’s public universities, 
figures from the 2008–2013 academic years show that less than half of their income now 
comes from government operating grants (COU, 2014). Even though the overall propor-
tion of funding from private donations remains small, today the names of wealthy donors 
are commonly displayed on the walls of university buildings and laboratories; those funds 
are highly sought after at the margins of institutional budgets and are used to leverage 
new directions on campuses. 
In Ontario PSE, geography also clearly shapes student preferences. Proportionately 
few Ontario students move across regions to attend university and colleges compared to 
those in countries such as the United States. For example, Davies, Maldonado, and Zarifa 
(2014) found that 62% of the Toronto District School Board (TDSB) graduates who went 
on to university remained in Toronto, and another quarter attended relatively high-status 
universities near the city, such as Guelph, Waterloo, Western, and McMaster. Only one 
percent attended universities in further locales such as Nipissing, Lakehead, Laurentian, 
or Windsor. An earlier study by Drewes and Michael (2006) on institutional selection 
within Ontario observed similar dynamics. They found that students’ ranked preferences 
were strongly influenced by spatial proximity. Much anecdotal evidence suggests that a 
large proportion of Ontario’s college and university students are commuters.3 
These considerations are important if calls for differentiation lead to sizeable reduc-
tions in program duplication across institutions and if more students are expected to trav-
el longer distances for certain programs. Since much of the demand for higher education 
in the province is local in nature, many potential undergraduates may be unwilling to 
travel long distances even for quite specialized fields. In a recent study of interdisciplinary 
programs in the United States, Jacobs (2013) found that many new academic units, even 
those touted as lying at the cutting edge of innovation, soon closed because they failed to 
capture student demand, or they were unable to attract private funders after a few years 
of operation. Thus, if differentiation entails having more institutions offer more special-
ized credentials, this policy could be undermined by students who want more general 
degrees and diplomas and/or are unwilling to travel long distances. 
Isomorphic Forces
Leaders of organizations in a variety of fields typically confront pressures to change 
while lacking the kinds of information that might facilitate rational and efficiency-seek-
ing decisions (Nelson & Winters, 1982; Simon, 2000; Spiegler, 2011). Higher education 
is one such field. Universities and colleges operate with a great deal of uncertainty. 
Rather than having a singular goal, such as selling a profitable product, they are com-
plex organizations with multiple goals and activities, most notably including teaching, 
research, and public service (Bastedo, 2007; Stevens, Armstrong, & Arum, 2008). Their 
constituents want them not only to produce graduates with marketable skills that stim-
ulate local economies, but also to be conduits of equal opportunity that nurture good 
citizens and enhance their community settings. But success at meeting these goals is 
often difficult to measure. Whereas an automaker can easily count the number of cars 
it produces and assess whether they are profitable, it is far more difficult for colleges 
and universities to assess whether their instruction has added value to their graduates’ 
skill sets and capabilities, never mind their aptitudes for citizenship and community 
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engagement. While K–12 schools assess some of their goals using standardized tests 
for foundational skills in math, reading, and writing, higher education lacks an agreed 
upon set of metrics that could demonstrate its impact on students. Accordingly, rather 
than closely regulating and monitoring their teaching, colleges and universities instead 
rely on a logic of confidence (Meyer & Rowan, 1977), in which instructors that have ap-
propriate credentials are hired and are presumed to be doing their jobs unless some 
extreme information to the contrary arises. Such conditions tend not to reward colleges 
and universities for efficient and effective completion of tasks. Rather, these conditions 
reward them for acting in ways perceived to be legitimate according to their institution-
al environment (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Meyer & Rowan, 1977), that is, the norms 
of their field. New institutional theory highlights several forces by which organizational 
change occurs under these conditions.
The first such force is termed mimetic isomorphism. In environments that lack clearly 
effective and efficient practices, decision makers typically mimic peer organizations they 
perceive to be successful (Mizruchi & Fein, 1999, p. 657; see also DiMaggio & Powell, 
1983; Scott, 2008). Following this logic, Ontario universities that are research intensive, 
or wish to become so, will mimic high-status institutions like the University of Toronto 
and Queen’s University. In turn, the University of Toronto and Queen’s will emulate glob-
al superstars such as Harvard, Yale, Oxford, or Stanford. This mimicry has been docu-
mented repeatedly in American PSE. While small state colleges rarely directly emulate 
Harvard, there is a broad tendency for institutions to follow the directives of organiza-
tions they consider to be their peers, whether in terms of mandate, organizational type, 
resource capacity, or status. Scott (2010, p. 12) highlights how less well-endowed schools 
doggedly follow directions set by more prestigious colleges. Brint, Riddle, and Hanneman 
(2006) also found that presidents of less prestigious four-year universities and colleges 
emulated their more prestigious counterparts by adopting comprehensive forms and in-
creasing research intensiveness and graduate training. This isomorphism tends eventu-
ally to lessen the aggregate amount of differentiation within PSE systems (for another US 
example, see Tuchman [2009]).
Mimetic isomorphism appears to be encouraging PSE organizations to aspire for uni-
versity status and even to become research universities. For instance, despite MTCU’s 
call for universities to showcase their institutional differences in their strategic mandate 
agreements (SMAs), most universities, whether research-intensive or comprehensive, 
produced SMAs that were surprisingly similar (HEQCO, 2013). One source of this unan-
ticipated uniformity may be the status that is associated with conducting research. Ap-
plications to the Postsecondary Education Quality Assessment Board (PEQAB) show that 
more and more colleges, such as Sheridan, are crossing sector boundaries and slowly 
transforming themselves into universities, following a route already paved by OCAD Uni-
versity and Ryerson. The latter has greatly expanded its graduate programs and research 
activity over the past decade, as have Laurier, Brock, and some other institutions that 
were primarily undergraduate institutions. Weingarten and Deller (2010) view this type 
of mandate creep negatively, warning that it leads to unnecessary and inefficient program 
duplication. Despite such criticism, these tendencies towards isomorphism are difficult to 
stop as long as institutions seek to raise their status (we will return to this line of reason-
ing in a later section). 
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Organizational change also occurs through what organizational researchers call nor-
mative isomorphism. This isomorphism is a product of the distinctive values, beliefs, 
and world views of professionals. Similar training in professional schools and graduate 
programs tends to forge shared norms among their graduates (Mizruchi & Fein, 1999; 
Morrill & McKee, 1993). These norms become embodied and enacted in professional or-
ganizations such as the College of Physicians and Surgeons of Ontario, the Law Society 
of Upper Canada, the Ontario Dental Association, and all sorts of academic associations, 
and have become quite institutionalized and taken for granted in the province. Almost 
all professors and academic administrators in universities are members of these profes-
sional bodies. Being well versed in professional academic norms, most continue to value 
conventions such as faculty research, academic freedom, liberal educational ideals, and 
tenure. These norms shape administrators’ implicit image of the ideal university and col-
lege and inform how they pursue organizational change, including decisions on what type 
of departments should continue to exist. Budros (2002), in a study of financial retrench-
ment in Ontario universities, found that presidents who lacked backgrounds in business 
and/or economics and did not have corporate connections were less likely to adopt cost-
saving reforms. Many professors, including administrators, often associate traditional 
liberal arts programs with the spirit, soul, purpose, and dignity of the ideal university and 
decry vocational training, careerism, and technological specialization (Gustafson 2009; 
Kraatz & Zajac, 1996; Leathwood & Hutchings, 2003). Any promotion of differentiation 
would need to partially align with these powerful professional norms. As evidence, Jacobs 
(2013) pointed to numerous examples of collegial reactions that have limited the number 
of departmental closures in US universities and colleges. He found that in addition to 
professors and students who are directly affected by closures, colleagues from far-flung 
disciplines and even other institutions have also reacted publicly, arguing that such losses 
damage the ecology of entire institutions. These reactions have sometimes forced admin-
istrators to reverse their previous decisions. 
Coercive isomorphism is a third process that tends to hinder differentiation (DiMag-
gio & Powell, 1983; Scott, 2008). Coercion refers to pressures generated by an actor’s 
dependency on financial resources and on central regulations. For instance, regulatory 
and funding arrangements often demand that various kinds of structures and practices 
be implemented in all organizations. One current example is the Ministry of Education’s 
mandate in Ontario to cut teachers’ college enrolments by half and double the program 
duration from one to two years by 2015 (Alphonso, Morrow, & Bradshaw, 2013). This min-
istry-initiated reform has quickly changed existing practices for all teachers’ colleges alike. 
As another example, the federal government’s research councils (SSHRC, NSERC, CIHR) 
have over the decades leveraged the erection of internal supporting structures (research 
offices, ethics committees, and the like) and procedures (ranking of doctoral applicants, 
ethics procedures) that are similar across universities; without them, such bodies would 
probably vary more across institutions and may even be entirely absent from some. Im-
portantly, such central pressures usually serve to make organizations more similar to one 
another. MTCU’s promotion of differentiation is an interesting central initiative that is 
aimed in the opposite direction—to make organizations more dissimilar from one another. 
Sometimes coercive initiatives are met by resistance when they run against the grain 
of longstanding practices. For instance, Hallett (2010) describes the turmoil in a Midwest 
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elementary school that resulted from faculty resistance to an externally imposed account-
ability scheme. While the reform was implemented to raise student test scores, teachers 
saw it as a threat to their autonomy and worked to thwart many directives prescribed 
by that policy. Sometimes coercion has only a partial impact in complex fields such as 
PSE, in which universities have multiple resource dependencies that tend to weaken the 
strength of any single coercive push from a central actor (Levy, 2006). MTCU lacks a 
monopoly on this type of force; as mentioned earlier, students can “vote with their feet” 
in response to any unwanted organizational change, as can corporate donors and federal 
government granters (Fisher et al., 2006). Beyond direct resistance and multiple resource 
dependencies, actors who receive central directives can undermine them using a variety 
of softer methods, some of which we describe next. 
Ceremonial Compliance
Researchers have long emphasized organizations’ tendencies to be structurally inert, 
particularly older enterprises that lack innovative capacity to quickly change course (Han-
nan & Freeman, 1984; Le Mens, Hannan, & Polos, 2014). But inertia can sometimes as-
sume a hidden form when organizations appear to respond to external coercive pressures 
without greatly altering their core practices. One typical strategy is known as conceal-
ment, in which organizations simply disguise their intention to not implement change 
(Oliver, 1992, pp. 154–155). In the business world, corporations can display non-routine 
activities during inspections by external stakeholders, such as government agencies, by 
deferring upkeep of physical plants until immediately before scheduled inspections, thus 
maintaining an impression of constant upkeep (Jackall, 1988, p. 23).
In education, organizational researchers refer to a similar but more subtle and sym-
bolic process known as ceremonial compliance. Organizations can change their formal 
structures in order to create the appearance of change and to signal conformity to exter-
nal dictates, but then allow their internal units to operate as before, largely independently 
of these dictates (Hallet, 2010; Scott, 2008). For instance, one simple method by which 
institutions align with new directives, but mainly only on the surface, is to rename old 
organizational components, often simply by putting new labels on old courses or pro-
grams (see Tyack & Cuban, 1995, p. 79). This can be partly seen in universities’ pursuit 
of all kinds of interdisciplinary studies over the past two decades. In response to a vari-
ety of pressures, universities have established numerous centres and institutes in areas 
ranging from nanotechnology to globalization to cultural studies. Some are vital, active, 
well-resourced bodies. But others are largely shadow constructs, borrowing staff, faculty, 
and courses from existing departments. Their websites and brochures can make them 
appear substantial despite many of their affiliates playing little in the way of active roles, 
and despite them occupying little or no physical space. Some of these centres and insti-
tutes appear to be exercises in organizational impression management more than deep, 
substantive change.
A similar organizational practice is known as loose coupling or decoupling. This prac-
tice enables organizations to alter their public facades or formal structures to align with 
central directives, while at the same time allowing ground-level actors leeway to use their 
own discretion to adapt (or not) to change and to local circumstances (Meyer & Rowan, 
1977; Weick, 1976). Loose coupling is a mechanism by which organizations can comply 
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with central directives formally while continuing with their existing practices. To signal 
change, universities readily alter the names of academic units rather than their core prac-
tices, since changing labels is much easier than overhauling established activities; studies 
have documented examples of units changing their name numerous times over a single 
decade (Jacobs, 2013). Colleges and universities can formally rebrand themselves by re-
labeling old courses, creating new credentials while retaining their core structures and 
underlying practices. 
Status Seeking
Another key dynamic that can buffer against the influence of any differentiation policy 
is status seeking. Most Ontario universities are non-profit entities that adhere to aca-
demic norms. Competition between institutions within that field tends to be driven not 
only by resource scarcity, but also by notions of prestige, reputation, and status (Davies & 
Pizarro Milian, forthcoming). Status hierarchies emerge both between and within broad 
categories of institutions (by size, region, age, and research intensiveness). These hierar-
chies may be contested, but they tend to endure, and in older systems such as those in the 
United States, they have a long history. Indeed, status competition between universities 
has intensified in recent years due to a combination of more complex resource depen-
dencies (i.e., organizations need to pursue multiple revenue streams rather than relying 
mainly on a single source) and because the means by which they compete has become 
more rationalized. 
One mechanism that has rationalized status competition is the visibility of published 
rankings of universities. Over the past two decades, Maclean’s rankings, along with 
various international rankings, have gained prominence in Canada (Drewes & Michael, 
2006; Pringle & Huisman, 2011). Even though many actors continually denounce, de-
cry, or mock these rankings, they have gained visibility with time. One reason may be 
that rankings are a simple means to generate images of an institution’s status. They offer 
applicants, alumni, and donors a single metric to summarize a multitude of qualitative 
differences between universities. This power to generate external images of universities 
tends to reshape their organizational practices, even among administrators who may be 
sharply sceptical of their validity, affecting how they define goals, assess progress, recruit 
and evaluate peers and students, forge new programs, and budget their resources (Espe-
land & Sauder, 2007). In the United States, some administrators claim that “[rankings] 
are always in the back of everybody’s head. With every issue that comes up we have to ask, 
‘How is this impacting our ranking?’” (Espeland & Sauder, 2007, p. 11). Some universities 
redistribute their resources to manipulate their scores in prominent ranking schemes. As 
one dean stated: “It would be stupid in a competitive environment not to do the things 
that are better for the US News” rankings (Sauder & Lancaster, 2006, p. 131). At the ex-
treme, institutions engage in gaming strategies in attempts to rig measures and raise their 
rank (for examples, see Stevens, 2009), particularly when downward slides prompt alarm 
from alumni, students, local media, and faculty. 
These practices are not restricted to the United States (Hazelkorn, 2009), although 
Canadian findings on the influence of rankings are mixed. Canadian students appear 
to consult rankings when selecting among relatively less known and small universities 
(Drewes & Michael, 2006), and rankings appear to partly influence students’ decisions 
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when they are selecting among large research universities (Kong & Veall, 2005). But anec-
dotal evidence hints that administrators are sensitive to any drops in their institution’s 
rank. When Brock fell down the rankings in 2011 after moving up to the comprehensive 
category, its provost lamented that “you have to have realistic expectations,” that it was 
their “first year being compared in this senior category” (Brock University, 2011). Even 
dismissive public statements about rankings from university leaders illustrate their sensi-
tivity to their institutional image. As one has stated: “We are concerned about Maclean’s 
rankings and our reputation . . . the outside environment has made us sensitive to this, 
and these pressures have become internalized” (Crocker & Usher, 2006, p. 10). Canadian 
universities that are highly ranked internationally, like the University of Toronto, regu-
larly announce their success in the rankings in promotional material.
Our point is that any preoccupation with rankings, prestige and status can pose a sig-
nificant barrier to differentiation. If status competitions tend to reward institutions for 
having certain practices and structures, many institutions will strive to adopt those prac-
tices and structures. For example, if the Maclean’s rankings give much weight to winning 
Tri-Council research grants, institutions will be incentivized to boost their research ca-
pacity and perhaps de-emphasize their undergraduate teaching. In such scenarios, status 
hierarchies could promote homogeneity rather than differentiation. 
Promoting Conditions in Favour of Differentiation
Organizations do sometimes drop traditional practices and comply with centrally di-
rected change. External shocks can drive organizations to reconsider their institution-
alized practices, particularly those that are visibly failing (Oliver, 1992). For instance, 
universities will (albeit reluctantly) close academic programs with tiny enrolments. More-
over, significant employee turnover, leader succession, and increases in workforce diver-
sity can promote slow change by disrupting internal norms and organizational traditions. 
Newcomers bring different interpretive frameworks and practices that can diminish con-
sensus and the taken-for-granted character of longstanding practices (Oliver, 1992, p. 
575). In Canadian PSE, Crocker & Usher (2006, p. 6) document the tendency of univer-
sities with younger faculty, who are less entrenched in traditional academic norms and 
practices, to have better “climates for innovation.”
Similarly, the MTCU could ease the pressures of normative isomorphism on universi-
ty administrators by staging system-wide workshops and seminars about differentiation 
and its potential benefits. But importantly, administrators should work with disciplinary 
representatives—key purveyors of normative isomorphism—to ponder their possible fu-
tures in Ontario PSE, allowing them to voice their concerns; otherwise, they may simply 
resist change.
To promote differentiation, the MTCU could also attempt to lessen the influence of 
rankings by providing alternative incentives for colleges and universities to attain sta-
tus along additional dimensions. If single ranking schemes cause status hierarchies to 
coalesce, multiple schemes can create more ambiguity about the relative standing of 
schools. This ambiguity could reduce the significance of small differences between ranks 
and even undermine their validity (Sauder & Espeland, 2006, p. 206). Multiple, crosscut-
ting status dimensions could instead encourage each institution to nurture its own unique 
reputation. This point speaks to differentiation policies that aim to reverse current ten-
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dencies for universities to prioritize research intensity over undergraduate teaching. Most 
rankings currently tend to reward research. But a more pluralistic status system could 
encourage diversity by lessening pressures on mid- to low-rank universities to conform 
to prevailing normative pressures in the form of emulating research universities. Beyond 
the sheer compulsion of seeking tuition dollars, those institutions could be encouraged to 
prioritize their undergraduate teaching if it were further associated with time-honoured 
liberal arts ideals rather than just resource efficiencies.4 Quite simply, lower ranked insti-
tutions may be more inclined to differentiate their mandates if any changes are seen to be 
consistent with their pursuit of upward mobility and status. 
Better interpretations of student preferences might also lower barriers to differentia-
tion. While MTCU already studies market forces in many ways, it may wish to develop 
new data sources. Administrators’ and policy makers’ information about student demand 
is lagged and imperfect. Existing administrative data from students’ ranked choices (e.g., 
Ontario Universities’ Application Centre data; see Drewes & Michael, 2006) has the limi-
tation of reflecting only existing arrangements in Ontario PSE rather than student prefer-
ences for potential institutions and/or programs. For instance, a Greater Toronto Area 
student who desires to enter engineering but currently lacks the grades to be accepted 
into the University of Toronto’s program might consider attending a new or expanded 
engineering program nearby at Ryerson or York but not at a more distant location such 
as Lakehead or Windsor. Surveys could be used to gauge such untapped demand among 
high school students by probing preferences for different combinations of programs, 
institutions, and locales. Those data might facilitate the development of differentiation 
strategies that are closely attuned to the wants of prospective students. 
Conclusion
Reshaping the structure of Ontario PSE will not be an easy task. Multiple organiza-
tional processes actively work against differentiation, and so the trajectories of any such 
policy are difficult to predict. Our review of organizational studies in higher education 
suggests that successful efforts to promote differentiation will likely need to closely align 
with consumer wants and also work in concert with prevailing mimetic, normative, and 
coercive forces that are currently promoting isomorphism. Reforms tend to stick and 
spark change if they are compatible with existing practices and norms. To encourage uni-
versities to really change rather than comply in mere ceremonial fashion, central direc-
tives should be compatible with prevailing academic norms and organizational practices, 
including those that are oriented towards the pursuit of institutional status. This recom-
mendation cannot ensure a seamless road towards a more differentiated Ontario PSE 
system, but it might reduce any potential conflicts by developing policy that can redirect 
the powerful forces that are currently encouraging isomorphism.
Notes
1. Such funding has explicitly excluded funding activities associated with sponsored 
research, interest payments, student financial aid, and ancillary enterprises/capital 
projects (MTCU, 2009, p. 1).
2 Here, Wolf (2011) highlights a benefit of loose coupling to which both early (Weick, 
1976) and contemporary (Aurini, 2012; Ethiraj & Levinthal, 2004; Hallet, 2010; Rav-
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asi & Verona, 2001) theorizing within organization studies have alluded. Loose cou-
pling allows actors on the ground to broadly comply with policies while feeling out and 
adapting to local conditions. We develop this argument further below.
3 Redeemer University College, for example, acknowledges on its website that approxi-
mately half of its students commute to its campus. Other universities, such as York, 
Ryerson, and McMaster, are also regularly referred to as having commuter campuses.
4 At the K–12 level, Quirke (2013) found that newer Toronto private schools that sought 
legitimacy without having bountiful resources often did so by embracing liberal arts 
ideals, relatively small classes, and a customer-oriented ethos.
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